principal problem for monetary policy at present is to achieve this gain by ending inflation at minimum transitional loss of output.
Every six months, I join with my colleagues on the Shadow Open Market
Committee in recommending a policy of pre-announced, gradual, sustained reductions in the growth of money as a means of restoring price stability. A clear statement of the reasons for a policy of this kind --often called gradualism --has not been provided. I will try to partially fill that gap and to relate the case for gradualism to some of the lessons we have learned from recent experience with sustained inflation.
The history of recent inflation is surrounded by myths that obscure the origins of the inflation and the reasons for its persistence.
I begin with an account of the origin and an explanation of persistence. Much of the case for gradualism depends on the way in which individuals form anticipations of the future. I present one view of rational expectations, in the sense of Muth (1961) , and use this model of expectations to show how Federal Reserve policy procedures can convert real shocks into permanent changes in the rate of price change.
Then I present the case for gradualism in a world in which persistent and transitory changes in monetary policy cannot be identified quickly.
THE ORIGIN AND PERSISTENCE OF CURRENT INFLATION
The most enduring myth about the origins of the current inflation is that the inflation started during the Vietnam war. According To sustain the thesis that the Vietnam deficits started the current inflation, one must not only ignore the problem of the timing of 1 See Perry (1978) followed by a balanced budget or a surplus but by sustained deficits.
Yet, most broad measures of the rate of price change declined in 1976.
The GNP deflator rose by less than 4.5%, on average, for the first three quarters of the year. and the consumer price index rose by less than 5% for the year as a whole. 2
The proximate cause of the start of the current inflation is the monetary policy of the early 196Os. Inflation persists because policy continues to sustain anticipations of future inflation by producing persistent inflation. Bursts of anti-inflation policy, and announcements of firm congnitments to reduce inflation, are not followed by policies that reduce money growth.
2 The decline in the rate of inflation affected more than just food prices as is sometimes claimed. The wholesale price indexes of consumer finished goods rose by less than 2.5% for the year. 1956-61, 1965-72 and 1974-78 that correspond to the two-year lag of prices behind the maintained growth of the monetary base. 3 The data are shown in Table 1 . Careful inspection of the data shows that periods of slower growth of the base coincide with these announcements in 1966, 1969-70 and 1974-75, but none of these periods of slower growth is long enough to have any marked effect on the~tandarddeviation of the growth rate of the base. Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of the two quarter moving growth rates is independent of the rate of growth of the base and not very different in the three sample periods.
Rate of Growth of the
The data suggest two reasons for the persistence of inflation and the slow response of inflation to changes in the growth rate of money.
First, short-term rates of price change are relatively variable, so people have difficulty separating the effects of money growth from other influences on short-term price changes. This is particularly the case for recent years, when announced changes in oil prices have had considerable influence on measured rates of price change and their variability. Second, the commitment to anti-inflation policies does not last. People are unwilling to buy long-term contracts based on the assumption that the slower rate of money growth will persist long enough to reduce the trend rate of inflation. In the next section, I
offer an explanation of the relation between the variability of money growth and the persistence of inflation.
THE BASIC INFERENCE PROBLEM 5
Each week the Federal Reserve reports the growth rates of various monetary aggregates. Market participants try to infer the future course of money growth, interest rates, prices and exchange rates from the announcement. Their problem, and ours as economists, is to separate transitory changes in money growth (or other variables) from persistent changes. I call this problem of separating permanent or persistent changes from ephemeral or transitory changes the basic inference problem because it arises for most economic variables and is a major problem for people making decisions.
To illustrate the problem, suppose that in a given week the announced change in money is large relative to past changes. Few observers will use the observation for a single week to predict the growth path, and fewer still will predict an equiproportionate change in the rate of inflation. Let the increased rate of money growth persist, for a month or two, and the balance of opinion will start to 5 This section owes a large debt to Brunner, Cukiernan and Meltzer (1979) .
change. More observers will infer that there has been a persistent change in the growth rate of money.
The effect of the first week's observation on market prices, interest rates and exchange rates differs from the effects of a change that is perceived to be permanent. Although the change in money is reported, and therefore is known, the correct inference to be drawn from the information is uncertain because the content of the information is uncertain. A rational investor who uses all available information, must first decide what he knows; that is to say, he must decide how much of the changes he has observed can be expected to persist.
This view of the world in which monetary and other policies operate differs in an important way from the usual model of rational expectations developed by Lucas (1975) and others. There, people are uncertain about whether the changes they observe are the result of shocks that change relative prices or shocks that change the absolute price level; once information becomes available, there is no doubt about its meaning.
Given the speed with which information becomes available, the confusion between aggregative and relative changes cannot be the principal source of confusion. The main aggregates in our models --money, debt and deficits or GNP, prices and output --are observed within a month or a quarter. Once they are observed, the confusion between absolute and relative changes disappears.
The permanent-transitory confusion does not disappear when data are published. The principal uncertainty that individuals face arises, in this model, from an inability to properly interpret information, not The expectation of X~,conditional on all information available in period t, is X~.
The inability to separate permanent and transitory components makes the optimal forecast of X a distributed lag of past observations.
Contrary to much of the rational expectations literature, 7 we find that 6 Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1979) . This application considers the effects of real shocks. The role of the permanent-transitory confusion in the transmission of monetary shocks to real variables introduces additional problems.
7 Benjamin Friedman (1979) is an exception.
using a distributed lag of past observations is an optimal method of forecasting. The reason is that repetitive observation of an aggregate are required to learn whether a permanent change has occurred. If permanent changes are frequent, and transitory changes are infrequent, a change in X is more likely to be treated as permanent soon after it occurs. At the opposite extreme, transitory changes are frequent and permanent changes are rare, so it is optimal to observe a relatively long series of observations before concluding that a permanent change 2 has occurred. In more technical terms, the larger the ratio the xq faster people correctly infer that a permanent change has occurred; the smaller the ratio, the larger is the number of observations required to sustain the inference that a permanent change has occurred.
We can put more content into the terms "frequent" or "infrequent" by using the computed standard deviations for the two quarter and threeyear moving averages in Tables 1 and 2 to estimate the relative variance of permanent and transitory components and to find the implied length of the lag in reaching rational judgments about permanent shocks.
The permanentS van ance of the growth rate of the monetary base is set equal to the variance of the three-year growth rates. The two quarter moving average growth rates include both permanent and transitory components. We assume that permanent and transitory variances are independent and compute the transitory variance by subtracting the variance of the twelve quarter average from the variance of the two quarter average. Muth (1960, pp. 302-4) Substituting eq. (1) into (2) and (3) The stock of base money B +~changes only as required to maintain the interest rate at i, which is to say that the stock of money now depends on the real shocks.
(6)~t~ (et~ut) Equations (4) and (5) to hold interest rates fixed until it decides that the shock is permanent.
Consider the effect of a negative productivity shock, dut < 0.
From (4) and (5) Suppose, however, that the negative productivity shock is permanent, or persistent, not transitory. In this case, the price level fluctuates around p 2 following the increase in money to LM 2 . Because permanent and transitory shocks cannot be observed separately, or
There are, of course, other causes of variability including the shocks to spending and the demand for money (Ct) and the Federal Reserve's response to these shocks. separated reliably, people must decide whether the observed rate of price increase, p 2 -p, the change in money, s'~, and other changes have caused a one-time price change or a persistent change in the rate of price change. If the inferences drawn from available information lead people to believe that some part of the change in the measured rates of price change and money are persistent changes in the rates of change, instead of one-time changes in level, the IS curve shifts further to the right. The size of the shift depends on the degree to which the anticipated rate of inflation,~-~rises.
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The Federal Reserve policy of fixing the interest rate at i sustains the inference that the observed changes in prices and money reflect a persistent increase in rates of change, not a one-time change in levels. The reason is that, when IS shifts to the right the policy of fixing interest rates requires the Federal Reserve to again increase the money stock, shifting LM further to the right.
The additional changes in money and prices reinforce beliefs about the persistence of the changes in money and prices. As the perceived and measured rates of inflation rise, anticipated inflation rises, and there is a further rightward shift in IS. Additional increases in money are now required to hold the market interest rate at i Each increase in the stock of money reinforces the belief that there has been a persistent change in the rate of money growth. Each increase in the equilibrium price level reinforces the belief that the run of transitory, negative shocks to productivity produces a similar result. is today's expectation of next period's price.
The rational expectation takes the form of a distributed lag, as indicated earlier, so expectations adjust gradually.
rate of price change has increased. The Federal Reserve's policy of maintaining the level of interest rates converts a one-tine change in the price level into a series of price changes that strengthen perceptions that there has been a change in the rate of change.
Rational investors "know" the model, so they know that anticipations about the price level adjust slowly because they and others are unable to separate persistent and transitory changes. The policy of holding the interest rates at i implies that the price level will rise as long as the money stock grows. That is, as long as~Pt 'p ositive, the policy of fixing interest rates will require the Federal
Reserve to let the money stock rise.
The Federal have no doubt that future research will find a better path.
SOME FINAL SPECULATIONS
The chief difficulty in the policy of gradualism is the length of time required to reach the rate of growth consistent with mom-inflationary growth in the economy. If we use the long-run growth of real output as a guide, the rate of base money growth must fall from the current rate of 8% to no more than 3%. If payments technology continues to improve, base velocity will rise in the future as it has for at least the past quarter century. The non-inflationary rate of base money growth is then no more than 1 or 2%.
Is a seven year program of sustained reductions in money growth the best that can be done? I expect not. There is reason to believe that policymakers cam increase their credibility by meeting preannounced targets. Increased credibility permits policymakers to lower the maintained growth rate while lowering the relative variance of the transitory component of money growth. Credible announcenents mean that individuals distinguish permanent changes closer to the time they occur by using announcements of proposed changes as a reliable indicator of future money growth.
No one can be very certain about these issues. The evidence on which we rely comes from experience in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and our own experience in the middle seventies. Each of these experiences suggests that within two to three years at most, the anticipated rate of inflation declines. The rate of price and wage change falls; long-term interest rates decline, and real output rises or accelerates.
Those who desire "incomes policies" to reduce the lag for adjustpnent might find pre-announced monetary policies more attractive than either the failed incomes policies of the past or present, or complicated, inefficient programs to tax wage and price changes. Instead of announcing the rate of price and wage changes that the government favors, the government can announce the rates of monetary and fiscal expansion that the government intends to maintain. These announcements, if they are credible, help individuals to form expectations about future rates of inflation.
Analysis of the length of the lag in the adjustment of anticipations relates these adjustments to the adjustment of pennanent values or maintained rates of change. The evidence we have is neither inconsistent with the theory of expectations that I have sketched nor more consistent with any other explanaion I have seen. This is not a strong claim, but it is considerably better founded than the belief that Inflation is intractable.
